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The Defense Attorney as Mediator in
Plea Bargains
Gabriel Hallevy*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE COMMON SCENARIO
Has the criminal defense attorney a role of mediator in plea bargain
negotiations between the prosecution and the defendant? A very common
scenario, for example, is when the criminal defense attorney in a murder
case goes to the District Attorney's offices in order to work out a possible
plea bargain. The defense attorney's client maintains that he has never
stabbed the victim, while the District Attorney claims that he has substantial
evidence to the contrary. The client's position is that he is innocent of the
charge and is entitled to a full acquittal, while the District Attorney demands
that the full weight of the law be brought to bear against him, including a
hefty custodial sentence. Defense counsel knows from reading the
evidential material that an integral part of his client's posturing, and that of
the District Attorney, merely amounts to rhetoric for the purposes of
conducting negotiations and that it would be an uphill battle to prove either
of the two extreme positions. Defense counsel has enough experience to
know that there is insufficient evidence in the case to convict his client of
murder, but the chances of an acquittal are also unclear. The acceptable
solution in the attorney's view is to reach a plea bargain, according to which
the client will admit to manslaughter' in return for a relatively light sentence
and enabling the prosecution also to feel vindicated. With this aim in mind,
the defendant's attorney travels to the District Attorney's office. Under
these circumstances, the client also needs convincing that this is the best deal
or, at least, it amounts to the lesser of two evils.
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Ono Academic College. Thanks to Ophira Grafi for
comments and discussions.
1. Defense attorneys use this approach even though, in most jurisdictions, manslaughter is an
offense which is separate and distinct from, rather than merely a degree of, the crime of murder.
See, e.g., State v. Brown, 126 A.2d 161 (N.J. 1956); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 775 (4th
ed., 2003).
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Such a scenario is the standard practice of defense attorneys in the
overwhelming number of cases. 2 In this article, it will be argued that
defense counsel's function in such instances is identical to that of a
mediator, seeking to reconcile the positions of the defendant and the
prosecution. Within this framework, the plea bargain should be seen as part
of the broad conception of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) which first
made its appearance at the end of the 1970s. An analysis of plea bargains in
the Western world as part of the broader concept of ADR actually shows that
it is the defense attorney, rather than the court or the other parties to the
issue, who functions as mediator, assessing the interests of the parties caught
up in the dispute. This also gives expression to the philosophy of
privatization upon which mediation is based.4 The tactics of influence and
use of an impression of force employed by the defense attorney in plea
bargains are identical in every way to those used by mediators. The methods
of persuasion, use of pressure, delineation of the debate, manipulations, and
numerous other parameters are identical to those employed by the mediator.
As a result, if indeed the mediation function of the defense attorney in plea
bargaining may be recognized, it will be argued that this has implications
rooted in applying the accumulated experience of the mediator in private
litigation to plea bargains in criminal cases.
II. PLEA BARGAINS AS ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CRIMINAL
CASES
In the modern Anglo-American legal systems, plea bargains are
increasingly a part of the modus operandi in criminal cases. The plea
bargain is the result of negotiations between the prosecution and the
defendant regarding the fate of the criminal case at its various stages.6 The
plea bargain may be concluded at any stage of the criminal proceedings-
from the time when the prosecution has resolved to file charges against the
2. See JOHN F. KLEIN, LET'S MAKE A DEAL: NEGOTIATING JUSTICE (1976); Gerard A.
Ferguson & Darrell W. Roberts, Plea Bargaining: Directions for Canadian Reform, 52 CAN. B.
REV. 497 (1974); Michael Zander, Bail: A Reappraisal, 1967 CRIM. L. REV. 25, 30; DONALD J.
NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (1966).
3. See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 84 (1978).
4. See Jean L. Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm 192 (2002).
5. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 696 (2001);
Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases,
44 BUFF. L. REV. 469,487 (1996).
6. Id. at 696 n.3.
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suspect, throughout the defendant's trial, or often even during an appeal.7 In
a plea bargain, the power to determine the fate of the case is passed on to the
parties who set out its terms in a contractual agreement.8 Within the
framework of a plea bargain, it is possible for the parties to reach agreement
regarding every detail connected with the criminal proceedings that is within
their power to determine. 9  The most common plea bargains include
agreement as to the relevant charges, their seriousness, number, and specific
identity because these are matters that the prosecution has the authority to
determine.'O The prosecution may also agree to limit its demands in relation
to the sentence to be imposed, thereby requesting a more lenient punishment
than the maximum one stipulated in the specific definitions of the offenses
in question." Within the framework of the plea bargain, the defendant
agrees to these limitations, which the prosecution has taken upon itself,
cooperates, and admits to the charges. ' 2 While the courts are not bound by
the details of the plea bargain and are at liberty to disregard them, this is a
relatively rare occurrence.'
In the adversarial system of justice, practiced mainly in the Anglo-
American legal systems, the hearing takes the form of a legal confrontation
(lis) between the parties involved in the case, and the court is then obliged to
decide between their respective arguments. 14  The parties to a matter
designated to be heard under the adversarial system play a pivotal role
during the proceedings, while the court's role is a relatively passive one,
limited essentially to determining the conflict between them.' 5  The
adversarial system, where practiced, applies to both civil and criminal
7. Id. at 702-03.
8. See Justin H. Dion, Criminal Law-Prosecutorial Discretion or Contract Theory
Restrictions?-The Implications of Allowing Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion Founded
on Underlying Contract Principles, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 149, 160-61 (2000).
9. See, e.g., Colquitt, supra note 5, at 711.
10. See id. at 701.
11. See id. at 702-03.
12. See id. at 701.
13. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 50 (1968); See generally JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, NEGOTIATED JUSTICE:
PRESSURES TO PLEAD GUILTY 46 (1977) (implying that courts failed to sufficiently investigate plea
bargains by giving examples of how defendants felt instructed or ordered to plead guilty by
barristers).
14. See, e.g., P.S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American
Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions 162 (1987).
15. Id. at 162-65; JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 1
(2003).
497
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hearings. 16 In civil cases, the dispute is between plaintiff and defendant, and
the court determines the argument between them. In a criminal trial, the
conflict is between the prosecution and the defendant, and the court is
required to rule on all aspects of the dispute between them, whether these
relate to the defendant's criminal liability or the punishment the defendant
should receive after being convicted. Similarly, the court is required to rule
on any procedural disputes arising regarding the manner in which the
proceedings themselves are conducted and the behavior of the parties before
it.'7  As already pointed out, the hearing of such disputes under the
adversarial system is based on the lis-model of conflict between the parties,
with the points of conflict between them being resolved by the court.
Within the framework of the lis-model, there should not be any special
significance to the fact that one of the parties is the State, but rather, both
parties should be treated in this specific context of resolving the dispute as
private litigants. Thus, just as in a civil suit where the State may sue or be
sued, in resolving the dispute the law should treat the State in the same way
as it does the opposing side, who is in fact a private party. In a criminal case
and therefore, within the lis-model framework of the adversarial system of
trial, legal disputes exist between the parties, one of whom happens to be the
State and the other the defendant, and the court is required to give its ruling
on the issues in contention between them. It should be pointed out that, in
those legal systems which allow the possibility of a private criminal
complaint, the criminal trial is conducted between two parties, neither of
whom has any legal ascendancy over the other. 1" The criminal trial held as a
private criminal proceeding utilizes the same methods of justice as does its
public counterpart.' 9
In noncriminal cases, alternative frameworks exist for resolving disputes
out of court. Such frameworks may take the form of arbitration,
mediation, compromise settlements, etc. The use of alternative methods of
conflict resolution in many instances has the effect of transferring the burden
16. See LANGBEIN, supra note 15, at 7-8.
17. Shelby R. Grubbs, Peter Machin North & World Law Group, Int'l Civil Procedure 737
(2003).
18. See, e.g., ALBERT FREDERICK WILCOX, THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE 3 (1972) (stating
how prosecutions in England and Wales need not be referred to a public prosecutor but can be
undertaken by any citizen).
19. See id. at 5, stating that the public prosecutor may intervene at any stage of the prosecution
if the private prosecutor does not abide by the public prosecution procedures. See generally
PATRICK DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 1-30 (1958) (describing the historical
background of private and public criminal prosecutions in England and the general structure of
private prosecutions).
20. This is due to the concept of ADR.
498
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of finding a solution to the impasse to the parties themselves. 2' Transferring
this responsibility for resolving their dispute to the parties themselves
amounts to a "privatization" of the traditional legal process conducted in
court because what is actually happening is the transfer of a public service
provided by a public institution to private hands.22 The public service in this
instance is the service of resolving disputes in a peaceful fashion-the public
body entrusted with the task of doing so is the court-and the private hands
are those of the parties, who have taken upon themselves the responsibility
of resolving the legal dispute between them.
This description is no different in relation to criminal proceedings.
Resolution of legal conflict between the prosecution and the defendant out of
court in a criminal proceeding under Anglo-American legal systems is
achieved mainly within the framework of a plea bargain. 23 The parties take
upon themselves the responsibility for resolving the conflict and, in so
doing, "Frivatize" the criminal process by removing it to their own private
domain. Because substantial public interests are also involved in plea
bargains, the court is required to approve each of them in order to protect
those interests and to ensure they are given due weight. 25 Nevertheless, as
already stated, rejection of or departure by the court from a plea bargain is a
rare occurrence and constitutes the exception rather than the rule.26
21. Thomas R. McCoy, The Sophisticated Consumer's Guide to Alternative Dispute
Resolution Techniques: What You Should Expect (or Demand) from ADR Services, 26 U. MEM. L.
REv. 975, 990 (1996).
22. See generally Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1497-
98 (1992) (describing the placement of responsibility on the parties to resolve a conflict through
mediation as a key component in the privatization of family law).
23. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 73-74, 87 (1977).
See also Jonas A. Myhre, Conviction Without Trial in the United States and Norway: A Comparison,
5 HOUS. L. REV. 647, 655-56 (1967) (stating that the practice of plea bargaining is commonplace and
detailing how the process works); John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea Bargaining and Plea
Negotiation in England, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 287, 287 (1979) (noting that the most common
method for prosecutors to try to resolve a case by obtaining a verdict of guilty is through plea
bargain negotiations).
24. See generally Singer, supra note 22, at 1497-98.
25. See Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of
Sentence, 66 YALE L. J. 204, 206-09 (1956).
26. See generally id. (providing statistics to show that most judges state that they will give a
more lenient sentence to a defendant entering a plea bargain and that defendants are willing to enter
plea bargains for that reason and not because they hope to have the plea overturned at a later time by
the court); Donald J. Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J.
CRIM. L. C. & P. C. 780, 783-785 (1956) (stating that those who typically agree to plea bargains are
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In fact, the plea bargain is an alternative to conducting a full criminal
trial in court (i.e., it offers a solution to the conflict in court) and, as such, is
an integral part of the broad and inclusive idea of the ADR. Because the
court's rejection of a plea bargain or departure from it is a rare event, the
essential elements of the deal are agreed upon out of court. The court is then
presented with a completed plea bargain for its approval. The discussions on
a plea bargain within the framework of ADR out of court should, therefore,
concentrate on negotiations between the parties leading up to the formation
of the plea bargain.27 The defense attorney is responsible for brokering the
system of interaction within the framework of the negotiations between the
parties. As a result, two different systems of interaction are created within
the framework of the negotiations between the parties, a system of
interaction between the defense attorney and the defendant and a system of
interaction between the defense counsel and the prosecution.
III. PLEA BARGAINS AS A MEDIATION PROCESS IN CRIMINAL CASES
If we accept the proposition that the plea bargain is an integral part of
the broad and inclusive concept of ADR, then amongst the various
recognized, existing methods within the ADR framework, the plea bargain
can be categorized as a mediation process.28 The general structure of this
mediation process is mediation between the defendant and the prosecution,
the defense attorney serving, for all intents and purposes, as a mediator
during the negotiating process. Initially, we shall evaluate the plea bargain
as a mediation process and, then, examine the status of the defense attorney
as mediator. It is difficult to present a single, broad, and comprehensive
definition of the mediation process because of the extensive variety of ways
in which the mediation process can take place. 29 Nevertheless, it is possible
to point to four main characteristics of the mediation process, which
constitute a broad common denominator regarding all types of mediation.
recidivists who expect to be convicted of something and are seeking a less severe sentence rather
than first-time offenders who hope that the court will overturn the plea at some point).
27. See Anne M. Heinz & Wayne A. Kerstetter, Pretrial Settlement Conference: Evaluation of
a Reform in Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & SOC'Y REV. 349, 351 (1979) (suggesting that the court would
have more input if it were allowed to participate in the formation of the plea through a settlement
conference).
28. See Brandon J. Lester, System Failure: The Case for Supplanting Negotiation with
Mediation in Plea Bargaining, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 563, 579-84 (2005).
29. See, e.g., Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for Perplexed, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela
P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998);
LAURENCE BOULLE & MIRYANA NESIC, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, PRACTICE 14-21
(2001); KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 16-17 (1994).
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These characteristics are the autonomy of the parties and their right to self-
determination, the parties' informed consent, fairness, and impartiality.30
These characteristics derive from general perceptions of the nature of
mediation according to which the object of mediation is to resolve disputes
by the parties reaching an agreement-the product of a joint commitment
with an attempt being made to develop consensus rather than dwelling on
conflicting rights and interests-with the assistance of a third party who
lacks any legitimate authority to determine the outcome of the dispute or to
impose an agreement. 31  These characteristics may partly overlap and
complement one another in achieving the aforesaid, overall goal of
mediation.32 We shall now examine the compatibility of the plea bargain to
the mediation process in the light of these four characteristics.
A. The Autonomy of the Parties and Their Right to Self-Determination
The autonomy of personal aspirations within the context of modern law
finds its clearest expression in the laws of contract.33 Recognition is given
to the autonomy of personal aspirations by the modem law,3 4 which gives
binding legal effect to contracts and recognizes the obligations resulting
from them. The plea bargain when stripped to its bare bones is a contract
between the defendant and the prosecuting authorities. The defendant is not
obliged to adopt a plea bargain or to take part in the negotiations that
preceded it. 35 The plea bargain is formed as a result of the parties' wishes.
If the autonomy of the parties' individual aspirations in a specific case leads
them to resolve their dispute within the framework of ADR, then giving
30. See OMER SHAPIRA, USE OF POWER AND INFLUENCE IN MEDIATION: PRACTICE AND
APPLIED ETHICS 7 (2007).
31. Susan Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 L. & POL'Y 7, 7 (1986).
32. See SHAPIRA, supra note 30, at 7.
33. See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 12-13 (1988);
JOSEPH A. KUPFER, AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 10-14 (1990). But see Camille A. Gear,
The Ideology of Domination: Barriers to Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Scholarship, 107 YALE
L.J. 2473, 2477-79 (1998) (noting the difficulty of preserving client autonomy in the contractual
relationship between attorney and client).
34. See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REv. 315, 336 (1987); Robert F. Cochran, Legal Representation
and the Next Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client
to Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819, 830
(1990).
35. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 12-13.
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validity to the plea bargain and its legal recognition represent the realization
of the autonomy of these individual aspirations. 36 The autonomy given to
the parties within the framework of a plea bargain includes recognition that
they should be free to resolve their dispute independently. This freedom is
not unlimited because the plea bargain must be consistent with the public
interest. Nevertheless, because the prosecution service is entrusted with and
responsible for the public interest and the public interest is one of the factors
to be considered by the prosecution in reaching a plea bargain, the
presumption is that the public interest finds expression within the framework
of the final plea bargain, a factor that also explains the courts' reluctance to
interfere in plea bargains.
The characteristic of the parties' autonomy and the right of the parties to
self-determination has been recognized as the main characteristic of the
mediation process in its many varied forms.37  The parties to mediation
choose to use the mediation alternative as part of the autonomy of their
aspirations in order to exercise their right to self-determination. The parties
are not obliged to refer their dispute to mediation but, rather, make an
autonomous choice to do so. The conclusion to be reached is that the
characteristic of the parties' autonomy and their right to self-determination is
the dominant characteristic in the context of both mediation and plea
bargains. The role of the mediator in this connection is to preserve the
parties' autonomy and their right to self-determination and to do so in such a
way that limits the damage to their aspirations. Mediation efforts that
preserve the parties' autonomy and their right to self-determination are, by
their nature, supportive rather than coercive.3 8 This is not to say necessarily
that the mediator may not take an interventionist approach;39 however, the
mediator should refrain from actions that might restrict the aforementioned
autonomy, including the giving of professional advice, applying pressure,
and using any similar actions. In light of this, there is some doubt as to
whether the defense attorney can satisfy these mediation criteria and is in a
position to act as a mediator in plea bargain negotiations.40
36. Cf Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for
Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775, 777 (1990) (explaining that parties
feel their personal aspirations respected when they can control the outcome of the ADR process).
37. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Am.
Bar Ass'n, & the Ass'n for Conflict Resolution 2005) [hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS,
MEDIATORS], http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model_standardssconduct_april2007.pdf
("[S]elf determination... is a fundamental principle of mediation .... ).
38. See Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-and of Mediator Activism, 33
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501, 502 (1997).
39. See id. at 503-04.
40. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
502
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B. Informed Consent
The characteristic of informed consent in the context of mediation
complements the characteristic of the parties' autonomy and right to self-
determination.4' Informed consent emphasizes two important facts. First, it
emphasizes that the parties have agreed to refer the dispute between them to
an alternative process and that they consent to the manner in which the
dispute is to be resolved. This is in contrast to a solution forced upon them
in the manner of a traditional court judgment.42 Second, it emphasizes that
this agreement amounts to informed consent. Informed consent means that
the parties have at their disposal all the relevant information required to
reach a decision on an agreed solution within the framework of mediation.43
Informed consent is regarded as a fundamental characteristic of the
mediation process. 44 This obligation results from the relationship of trust
between the mediator and the parties. Informed consent is also a sweeping
form of agreement in terms of the implications that stem from the solution
agreed upon by the parties, which may detrimentally affect one or both of
them. Meticulousness in providing the parties with access to information is
also intended to prevent exposure to manipulation and trickery, the decisions
they take being made on the basis of maximum certainty.
Informed consent is an essential element of the plea bargain. In order
for the parties to the plea bargain to correctly assess the risks and
opportunities contained within the plea bargain, they must, at the very least,
be completely familiar with the evidence in the criminal case. Familiarity
with the relevant legal interpretation of that evidence, including precedents
in the appropriate field, is also likely to be of substantial importance in
41. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 36, at 840. See generally Gabriel Hallevy, Victim's
Complicity in Criminal Law, 22 INT'L J. OF PUNISHMENT AND SENT'G 72, 72-93 (2006) (discussing
the general status of the informed consent in criminal law).
42. See HENRY J. BROWN & ARTHUR L. MARIOTT, ADR PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 110
(1993); JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING
CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 10 (1984); James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing and Hashing It
Out: Is This The End of "Good Mediation "?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 47, 74 (1991).
43. See Weckstein, supra note 38, at 503 ("The key to self-determination is informed consent.
A disputant who is unaware of relevant facts or law that, if known, would influence that party's
decision cannot engage in meaningful self-determination.").
44. See, e.g., CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS STANDARDS IN BUSINESS,
HEALTH, AND LAW 595 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 4th ed. 1999) ("The neutral has an obligation to assure
that all parties understand the nature of the process, the procedures, the particular role of the neutral,
and the parties' relationships to the neutral.").
503
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assessing the possibilities and risks involved. Occasionally, information
obtained may also include the identity of the judge who is expected to hear
the case and the position the judge has adopted until now in similar cases;
the policy of the prosecution, if one exists, with regard to the type of
offense(s) in question; statistical data on the severity or otherwise of
punishment; and the conviction rate in such cases. In any event, the nature
of the evidence in the case and its legal interpretation are the main factors to
which the parties must be exposed prior to entering into the process of plea
bargaining. Clearly, awareness of this information should be mutual
because any inequality in this regard would give an unfair advantage to one
party at the expense of the other. In light of this, it is apparent that the
characteristic of informed consent is a dominant factor in the mediation
process leading to the plea bargain. The role of the mediator in this context
is to enable free access to relevant information, especially information that
the mediator has and that touches upon the mediator's role during the
mediation proceedings, and even to bring this information to the parties'
attention if they were unaware of it. This raises the question of whether the
defense attorney fulfills the criteria applying to a mediator in plea bargain
negotiations, especially when it comes to transferring information to the
prosecution that relates to the defense of his client.4 5
C. Fairness and the Half-A-Loaf Theory
The characteristic of fairness in mediation is perceived differently from
the fairness to be expected during a trial because of the contrasting nature of
mediation vis-A-vis the judicial process. While the fairness to be expected in
court proceedings relates to guaranteeing conditions of objectivity and the
absence of favoritism, fairness in mediation is customarily identified with
the parties' ability to realize their freedom of choice within the framework of
their autonomy and right to self-determination.46 Fairness in the context of
mediation is not limited to the parties themselves, but should also be shown
towards third parties. For example, this can be done when relating to the
welfare of children whose parents are participating in mediation efforts
during divorce proceedings 47 by bringing the parties to mediation broader
and inclusive information to assist them in reaching their decisions. In this
45. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
46. See SARAH R. COLE, CRAIG A. McEWEN & NANCY H. ROGERS, MEDIATION: LAW,
POLICY, PRACTICE § 2:2 (2d ed., 2001); Joseph P. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 909, 910-14 (1998).
47. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3161-3162, 3180, 3184 (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
23-604 (West 2008).
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regard there is also somewhat of an overlap with the characteristic of
informed consent discussed above. Fairness in mediation by way of
realizing the parties' freedom of choice is designed to prevent the creation of
an imposed solution; thus, its essential features are procedural and deal with
the manner in which the mediation process is conducted48 as opposed to the
fairness of the results of that process. 49 The main difficulty in ensuring
procedural fairness in the mediation process has its roots in the fact that the
process is not based on strict, formal proceedings, a feature which
distinguishes it from the judicial process.50 There are those who have
proposed imposing conditions to guarantee the fairness of the mediation
process, to ensure that it facilitates a dialogue which maintains the parties'
right to dignity and to be appreciated, to balance the parties' relative
strengths, to guarantee an absence of bias on the part of the mediator, and to
encourage informed decisions to be made.'
Fairness in plea bargaining is different from that expected in the
courtroom. A plea bargain is not an objective affair because it reflects
contractual negotiations conducted between two interested parties.
Nevertheless, the plea bargain represents part of the parties' ability to realize
their freedom of choice within the framework of their autonomy and right to
self-determination. 2 The parties' freedom of choice in this case is to
minimize the risks inherent in conducting a criminal trial, in all its aspects,
in favor of a prior agreed determination as to the results of the process.
5 3
The fairness of the plea bargain in this context is in allowing the parties to
48. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 1359, 1402 (discussing one of the goals of ADR
to be balancing the power imbalances between the parties to ensure that the process is fair); Trina
Grillo, The Mediation Alternative -Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1582-93
(1991) (discussing the importance of ensuring a fair process in the marriage dissolution context);
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 144-45 (1983).
49. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or
Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575, 576-81 (1997) (discussing the role of good faith in
mediations); BROWN & MARIOTT, supra note 42, at 340 (opining that mediators have responsibility
for the fairness of the mediation process while it is up to the parties to determine the outcome).
50. BoULLE & NESIC, supra note 29, at 69-70.
51. See Stulberg, supra note 46, at 944-45 (proposing a statute for negotiation and mediation
regulation that would ensure fairness and party autonomy).
52. See Stephen F. Ross, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Ignoring Prosecutorial Abuses in Plea
Bargaining, 66 CAL. L. REV. 875, 875 (1978) (giving the constitutional premise that plea bargaining
creates a "mutuality of advantage" between the prosecutor and the defendant).
53. See id. at 879 (reasoning that plea bargaining is fair to both sides because a plea of guilty
also yields a dismissal of some of the prosecutor's charges toward the defendant).
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realize their said freedom of choice. 4 The negotiations conducted by the
parties, leading to a plea bargain, amount to a dialogue between them, which
maintains their right to dignity and appreciation. The plea bargain acts to
balance the disproportionate relationship between the prosecution and the
defendant by ensuring that neither walks away empty handed (the half-a-loaf
theory),55 which, in turn, is the result of the need to compromise. While the
plea bargain does not guarantee that a state of complete equilibrium will be
achieved between the relative strengths of the parties, it does represent a
substantial step forward in reaching this goal. 6 Even general mediation
does not guarantee that absolute balance will be achieved between the
disproportionate strengths of the parties, but it is a step in this direction.
While a dominant party will continue to be dominant due to its resources and
abilities, the mediation process does go some way towards neutralizing those
advantages. The conclusion to be reached is that the characteristic of
fairness is a relevant factor both in conducting the mediation process and in
reaching a plea bargain. This raises the issue of whether the defense
attorney fulfills the criteria of fairness in mediation proceedings as a
mediator in plea bargain negotiations because the defense attorney also
represents the interests of his or her client, which happen not to coincide
with those of the prosecuting authorities. 5
D. Neutrality
The characteristic of neutrality relates directly to the relationship
between the mediator and the parties to mediation as an integral part of the
mediation process. In accordance with the characteristic of neutrality, the
mediator must be impartial in relations with the parties within the framework
of the mediation process. 58  Neutrality means the absence of bias and an
54. See id. at 879-80 (stating that if prosecutors have discretion in charging the defendant's
offenses, then a plea bargain which dismisses some charges in return for a plea will be beneficial to
both sides).
55. HERBERT S. MILLER, WILLIAM F. MCDONALD & JAMES A. CRAMER, PLEA BARGAINING
IN THE UNITED STATES 97-99 (1978). Miller discusses the half-loaf theory as follows: prosecutors
and defense attorneys arrive at a negotiated conviction for the defendant that is not as severe as
originally charged but also not an acquittal; the bargain allows for the prosecutor to get a conviction
and not risk trial while the defendant is assured of less jail time than under a conviction. Id. at 98.
Some argue that plea negotiations result in a more intelligent result than trial because juries are often
left with the extreme alternatives of conviction or acquittal when an "intermediate judgment" would
be most just. Id. at 99.
56. Id., discussing the value to an "intermediate" judgment achieved through plea bargaining.
57. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
58. See Oma Cohen, Naomi Datner & Ahron Luxenburg, The Limits of the Mediator's
Neutrality, 16 MEDIATION Q. 341, 341-43 (1999) (discussing the complex and multi-faceted aspects
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evenhanded approach by the mediator in addressing the parties, the absence
of conflicts of interest with the parties, and also equidistance-maintaining
an equal distance from both parties in conducting the mediation process.5 9
The general guideline for mediators is to refrain from taking any action that
might be interpreted as showing favoritism to one of the parties and from
displaying prejudice and preconceived notions regarding the personal
characters of the parties and their behavior during the course of the
mediation proceedings.6°  Different rules that have been drafted for
mediators with respect to the characteristic of neutrality emphasize the need
for the mediator to resign if the mediator cannot be impartial or if the
mediator's objectivity might be compromised by personal background,
experience, or personal or professional relationship with one of the parties to
the mediation61
The need for neutrality in mediation often prevents the process from
beginning. Accordingly, it has been suggested that a distinction be drawn
between neutrality and impartiality. Neutrality relates to the absence of
conflicts of interest between the mediator and the parties; whereas,
impartiality relates to neutrality as fairness-the manner in which the
mediator should conduct the proceedings and relate to the parties. Neutrality
touches upon the mediator's background and relationship with the parties,
including any prior association with either of them, as well as the existence
of any personal interest the mediator may have in the outcome of the
mediation; impartiality merely implies evenhandedness, objectivity, and
fairness towards the parties to the mediation, including the time apportioned
of mediator neutraility); JONATHAN G. SHAILOR, EMPOWERMENT IN DISPUTE MEDIATION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATION 8 (1994) (investigating the essential aspects of the
mediator as a neutral).
59. CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT 52 (2d ed., 1996). See also REBECCA J. WEINSTEIN, MEDIATION IN THE
WORKPLACE: A GUIDE FOR TRAINERS, PRACTICE AND ADMINISTRATION 68 (2001) (distinguishing
between neutrality and impartiality); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers Responsibilities, 38
S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 443 (1997) (introducing the argument for a departure from the traditional view
that mediators are distanced, unbiased, impartial, and neutral); Janet Rifkin, Jonathan Millen & Sara
Cobb, Toward a New Discourse for Mediation: A Critique of Neutrality, 9 MEDIATION Q. 152-153
(1991) (defining neutrality as impartiality and equidistance).
60. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 9 (2001), available at www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma (last
visited Mar. 21, 2009).
61. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS, MEDIATORS, supra note 37, at § 2; MODEL STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION § 2 (Symposium on Standards of Practice 2000),
available at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/modelstandards.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
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between them, together with the absence of any external impression of bias
shown towards one of the parties.62 In light of this dichotomy between
neutrality and impartiality, it is suggested that impartiality be treated as an
essential and indispensable component of mediation proceedings; whereas,
neutrality may be regarded as a less than absolute concept and may be
realized or diminished without detrimentally affecting the essential character
of the proceedings as a mediation process.
63
This distinction must be recognized in both mediation proceedings and
plea bargains. The neutrality of the defense attorney, who functions as
mediator in plea bargain negotiations, shall be discussed below. 64 However,
it may already be indicated at this stage that the defense attorney first and
foremost represents a client against the prosecuting authorities within the
framework of negotiations leading to a plea bargain. This begs the
unavoidable question of whether the defense attorney can be neutral in
relation to the defendant and the prosecution while, at the same time,
representing the defendant, who is, after all, paying the attorney's fees.65
IV. THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY AS MEDIATOR IN PLEA BARGAIN
NEGOTIATIONS
A. Formation of the Plea Bargain From an Alternative Dispute Resolution
Perspective in Plea Bargains
In light of the foregoing discussion of the four central characteristics of
the mediation process, the question arises as to whether the defense attorney
may be regarded as a mediator when a plea bargain is being negotiated
between the prosecutor and the defendant. The main difficulty regarding
this matter is the defense attorney's formal role in the case as the defense
attorney and not as mediator. However, the central argument, which shall be
made hereinafter, is that, notwithstanding the formal role as the defense
attorney, the defense attorney does fulfill the essential role of mediator in the
plea bargain between the prosecutor and the defendant. For the purposes of
analyzing the defense attorney's essential function as a mediator in the plea
bargain, it is necessary to distinguish between two types of interested parties
62. See BOULLE & NESIC, supra note 29, at 448.
63. See id. at 18-19. "It is not possible to assert as a matter of definition that mediators are
always neutral. However, whatever their lack of neutrality, they are required to act impartially, that
is, fairly and without bias." Id. at 19.
64. See discussion infra Part l.E.
65. See discussion infra Part IV .E.
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involved. The prosecutor and the defendant are the primary interested
parties; that is, they have a direct interest in the plea bargain. The prosecutor
seeks to promote the public interest as much as possible, which generally
means issuing serious charges and insisting on draconian sentences, but the
defendant's interest is in being charged with a minor offense and receiving
only a light sentence if this can be achieved.66 By way of contrast, the
interest of the defense attorney in the plea bargain is of a secondary nature;
the defense attorney does not necessarily have a direct interest in the specific
details of the bargain or its consequences but, rather, in other concerns.
The secondary concern of the defense attorney in the plea bargain is to
strike the deal between the prosecution and the defendant and to stick to the
plea bargain agreed upon in court in the face of possible judicial criticism.
In order to do so, the defense attorney must strike a balance between two
pivotal factors during the negotiations leading to the formation of the
agreement. The first factor is the primary interest of the defendant, who is
the client. The defense attorney seeks to conclude the best possible deal
from the client's point-of-view. On many occasions, the efficiency,
credibility, and professionalism of the defense attorney will be measured by
the client according to what the client, with the tools at the client's disposal,
perceives to be the nature of the plea bargain. The second factor is the
relevant legal position. In this context, the defense attorney must deal with
both the relevant law regarding the type of incidents in question and the
relevant public interest. The defense attorney should be aware that the
incomplete inclusion of the second factor might well prevent a plea bargain
from being reached or from being approved by the court. The primary
method for realizing the secondary interest in the formation of a plea bargain
is to proximate the wishes of the parties until there is a "meeting of the
minds," while bearing in mind the public interest and the law in order to
make obtaining the court's approval a formality.
67
66. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 52 (1968).
67. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1308-09 (1975) (describing how the defense attorney should let the client make the ultimate
decision whether to plea but should advise the client whether the plea is likely to be accepted by the
court); Martin Marcus, Above the Fray or Into the Breach: The Judge's Role in New York's
Adversarial System of Criminal Justice, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 1193, 1209 (1992) (stating that the
ultimate factor in determining whether a plea is successful is whether the judge will be convinced
that it serves the interests ofjustice and, therefore, approve the plea).
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This manner of reaching a plea bargain requires that the defense
attorney in essence fulfills a mediation function based on the relationship he
enjoys with the defendant and with the prosecution. Within the framework
of negotiations leading up to a plea bargain the defense attorney can act, for
all intents and purposes, as a mediator. These negotiations are conducted
ostensibly between the defendant and the prosecutor, with the defense
attorney serving as the defendant's formal spokesman. In reality, however,
two different dialogues take place: one between the defense attorney and the
defendant and the other between the defense attorney and the prosecutor.
When the defendant is represented by an advocate, it is unreasonable to
expect the defendant to conduct an independent dialogue with the
prosecutor.
From a mediation perspective, there are three main stages to reaching a
plea bargain. The first stage is the feasibility stage, during which the
defense attorney will try and convince the defendant that reaching a plea
bargain in light of the legal and factual situation in which the defendant has
been caught up in, is a necessity. At the same time, the defense attorney will
try and convince the prosecution of the need for a plea bargain. It may be
that there will be no need for both dialogues and one will suffice. The
nature of this stage will be determined by the identity of the party who takes
the initiative in bringing about the plea bargain. If it is the prosecutor who
initiates the process, it is reasonable to expect that the defense attorney's
efforts at persuasion will be confined only to the defendant
The second stage is the stage of negotiations designed to bring about a
contractual "meeting of the minds." At this stage, two types of dialogue will
actually be needed: one between the defense attorney and the defendant and
the other between the defense attorney and the prosecution. Within this
framework, the defense attorney will most likely use all of his or her powers
of persuasion and ability to exert force as part of the mediation effort to
bring the parties to an agreed solution. These methods include: pressuring
the parties, proposing and fashioning a solution, determining the subjects for
discussion, holding separate meetings, withholding relevant information,
presenting information in a manipulative way, altering the relative
bargaining strengths of the parties, persuading, exchanging interests, and
even offering gratuities by the mediator.68 Use of these tactics shall be
discussed hereinafter in light of the fact that the defense attorney's approach
embodies the central characteristics of mediation. 69 The goal of this stage is
68. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator, 2 CLINICAL
L. REv. 73, 101-19 (1995).
69. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Note: Getting to "Guilty": Plea Bargaining as
Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 119 (1997).
510
16
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol9/iss3/3
[Vol. 9: 3, 2009]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
to bring about a contractual agreement between the parties regarding the
details of the plea bargain.7 °
The third and final stage is the stage of drafting and validating the
agreement. By this time, the parties will be aware of and will have
consented to the details of the bargain. The formal arrangements necessary
in order to bring the deal to fruition are likely to include a detailed written
agreement and changes to or the withdrawal of the original indictment.71
What needs to be done in order to validate the plea bargain depends upon the
specific stage in the criminal proceedings during which it was concluded. If
an indictment had already been filed in court, validation will generally take
the form of a court hearing, during which the judge will grant the plea
bargain the status of a court judgment. It is not, however, entirely unusual
for a deal to be struck out of court during the initial stages of the process.
Validation by the court is unnecessary, for example, in those instances in
which the obligation that the prosecution takes upon itself is not to file an
indictment at all.
Even when the plea bargain is not the result of protracted and exhaustive
negotiations but is arrived at within the court itself and in the shortest
possible time (perhaps even due to pressure exerted on the parties by the
judge), each of the aforementioned stages exist from a conceptual point-of-
view. A judge who pressures the parties to reach a plea bargain assists in
completing the first stage. The negotiations during the second stage take
place during the court hearing, when the details of legal agreement are
determined. Finally, the plea bargain will be drafted, even if this takes the
form of declarations made by the parties that are entered into the court
record and approved by the judge. This description of the formation of a
plea bargain raises questions regarding the defense attorney's role as
mediator. The role as mediator in this context, and especially during the first
and second stages of forming the plea bargain, must be evaluated in the light
of the four essential characteristics of the mediation process discussed
70. See Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading
Off?, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1399, 1406 n.10 (2003) (describing the form of plea bargaining as a
weighing of interests similar to what happens in contractual negotiations); Hollander-Blumoff, supra
note 69, at 119 (stating that, to get to agreement, the parties undertake some form of contractual
negotiations); Uphoff, supra note 68, at 131-32 (describing how the defense attorney should make
suggestions to the client in these negotiations but should ultimately leave the plea decision up to the
client).
71. Uphoff, supra note 68, at 132 n.241.
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above: the autonomy of the parties and their right to self-determination,
informed consent, fairness, and neutrality.
B. The Autonomy of the Parties and Their Right to Self-Determination in
Plea Bargains
The question that needs to be asked in this context is whether the role of
the defense attorney as mediator within the framework of a plea bargain
between the prosecutor and the defendant has a detrimental effect on the
autonomy of the parties and their right to self-determination, which are
characteristics that typify the mediation process. While, as indicated above,
the existence of this characteristic of mediation does not necessarily rule out
the possibility of the mediator adopting a more interventionist role,72 the
mediator must refrain from any activity which would have the effect of
limiting the aforementioned autonomy, including from providing
professional counsel or exerting pressure. The defense attorney is liable to
use tactics such as: pressuring the parties (including by threatening to set
forth ultimatums having the potential to damage any party who refuses to
acquiesce in the formation of a plea bargain), creating artificial time
constraints by stipulating a final date for making decisions, and expressing
an opinion regarding the state of the case in order to channel the listener
towards a particular solution.
The application of pressure by the mediator is not necessarily in itself an
illegitimate act from the standpoint of the autonomy of the parties; it only
becomes so if it is designed to limit the choices available to the parties.
73
There is, therefore, nothing untoward in the mediator applying pressure that
is designed to increase the parties' capacity for self-determination. For
example, it would be legitimate for defense counsel to pressure either the
prosecutor or the defense attorney's own client to obtain all the information
necessary in order to form a plea bargain. Similarly, if the mediator suggests
a tailored solution to the parties, this would not be considered detrimental to
the parties' autonomy because they are the ones with the power to resolve
the dispute and such a proposal only widens the range of options before
them. Therefore, if defense counsel offers both parties a compromise
proposal on the basis of which a plea bargain may be formed, this does not
adversely affect the parties' autonomy and their right to self-determination.
Deciding which subjects are to be debated within the framework of plea
bargain negotiations and which are to be left out of the discussions does not
72. See Weckstein, supra note 38, at 502-03.
73. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?
The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REv. 253, 278 (1989).
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necessarily damage the parties' autonomy-the reason being that there is no
obligation to include within a plea bargain all matters over which the parties
disagree. A partial plea bargain may also be legitimate. Thus, a plea
bargain in which the prosecution agrees to reduce the charge from robbery to
theft, the defendant admits to the lesser charge, and the parties are free to
plead regarding severity of sentence would be legitimate in this context.
This bargain reflects the full agreement reached by the parties because
consensus would have reached regarding the type of offense but not the
punishment to be imposed.
The holding of separate meetings within the framework of the
negotiations (between defense counsel and the defendant and between
defense counsel and the prosecution) is often necessary in order to arrive at a
plea bargain, and this becomes a vital tool if the parties take up entrenched
positions and, as a result, become deadlocked. Nevertheless, the separate
meeting is a fertile ground for manipulation and deceit by both the mediator
and the parties, who may expose the mediator to incorrect information
without fear of the reproach that would follow if the meeting were to be held
simultaneously with both parties, each acting as watchdog with regard to the
information presented by the other side. As a rule, to the extent that holding
separate meetings with the parties enhances the level of communication
between them, whether due to the fact that the gulf between their respective
positions is too wide or whether the atmosphere in a joint meeting would
most likely be too charged, it is welcomed as a way of advancing the
mediation process. Thus, if defense counsel holds separate meetings with
the prosecution and the defendant at the first and second stages of forming
the plea bargain with the aim of softening their positions and eroding the
differences between them in order to lead to a "meeting of the minds," this
contributes to, rather than detracts from, the parties' autonomy and right to
self-determination. On the other hand, if the mediator exploits the separate
meeting in order to transfer information to one of the parties in an unfair
manner or in order to pressure that party unfairly, this would be injurious to
the parties' autonomy.
The transfer of misleading information or the refusal to transfer relevant
information damages the autonomy of the parties because their ability to
reach a suitable result within the framework of the proper process of
decision-making has been prejudiced. The provision of relevant information
within the framework of plea bargains is dictated not only by the needs
created during formation of the plea bargain, which reflect the interests of
the parties, but also by legal requirements. The relevant information
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regarding the manner in which the courts deal with the type of criminal case
in question, for example, is information that the parties require in order to
reach a settlement because, once in possession of it, they can adopt positions
based on a correct appraisal of the opportunities and risks facing them.
Defense counsel has no authority to transfer information if to do so would
constitute a breach of the client's right to client-lawyer privilege. However,
this in no way prejudices the prosecution's right to request factual details
from the investigating authorities in accordance with the procedural law
applied at the specific stage reached in the criminal proceeding in question.
In fact, the said privilege in this context only acts to prevent the transfer of
information from the weak party (the defendant) to the strong party (the
State), but does not restrict the prosecution's right to use all the available
means at its disposal within the framework of the criminal process to expose
the truth (by questioning witnesses, arresting suspects, and carrying out
searches). The transfer of false information to the prosecution is also
forbidden by law and, in many countries, constitutes a criminal offense. The
transfer of incorrect information to a client is prohibited by the rules of
professional etiquette; it may, in addition, constitute grounds for an action in
tort and, in many countries, for a criminal offense.
In evaluating the bargaining strengths of the parties to a plea bargain
from a mediation point-of-view, it would appear that both parties have the
opportunity of continuing their negotiations or beginning the full criminal
process with all the possibilities and risks that entails. The presumption is
that, because the parties have moved from the first stage (the feasibility
stage) to the second stage (the negotiations phase), they have a mutual need
to reach some sort of plea bargain-the details of which will be hammered
out during negotiations. This need may highlight deficiencies in the
evidence required in order to prove the allegations-the fact that those
allegations have already been disproved by the other side, technical
problems engendered by the burden of overwork, and the absence of the
mental resilience necessary on the part of the defendant to go through a full
trial. Nevertheless, it ought to be pointed out that, while the prosecutor has
the professional expertise necessary to arrive at a plea bargain because of
operating as an experienced and professional advocate, the defendant has to
rely on a defense attorney. The defendant does not, as a rule, have the tools
necessary to handle the information to which he or she is exposed and to
know whether that information is all the information he or she needs to
know. In such cases, the defendant will probably partially or fully relinquish
personal autonomy and right to self-determination, either openly or
confidentially.
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An informed waiver of personal autonomy and the right to self-
determination is also possible. This concession is likely to express itself
during mediation proceedings when one of the parties asks the mediator to
make decisions on that party's behalf, to suggest to the party a solution
which seems fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case, or to
counsel the party as to which of the possible alternatives would be wise to
take.7s Sometimes, in pressurized situations, this type of concession may be
made because a party wishes to rely on the expertise of a professional and to
be freed from the burden of decision-making. 76 This situation is not
uncommon in the context of plea bargains. The defendant is likely to rely on
the discretion of an attorney in order to be freed from the burden of making a
decision, and there can be no doubt that being the subject of a criminal
investigation and then being indicted are pressurized situations for the
ordinary person. Having said this, because the process is one of mediation, a
party to the mediation cannot relinquish the existence of a right to make the
decision regarding the solution to the dispute.77 In a plea bargain situation,
defense counsel presents the deal that has taken shape with the prosecution
to the client for final approval, and, thus, the mediation-style character of the
plea bargain is not prejudiced. Defense counsel's mediation role allows the
parties to formulate the fine print of their agreement through negotiations to
boost their autonomy and right to self-determination. To this end, defense
counsel uses pressure as a tactic to preserve the parties' autonomy and right
of self-appreciation. Other types of tactics are prohibited by law in a
substantial number of instances and are, therefore, irrelevant. The upshot of
all this is that defense counsel is likely to be regarded as a mediator to the
extent that the defense counsel's plea bargaining activities affect the
autonomy of the parties and their right to self-determination.
74. See DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 118.
75. Strauss, supra note 34, at 346. Compare DAVID KiPNIS, TECHNOLOGY AND POWER 43
(1990) (criticizing those that waive autonomy by accepting a court-appointed arbitrator's decision
rather than attempting to resolve the conflict independently of that decision), and CARL E.
SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS AND MEDICAL DECISIONS 186
(1998) (stating that the complexity of medical decisions often makes the costs of achieving
autonomy outweigh its benefits).
76. Strauss, supra note 34, at 346.
77. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 43 (1975) (describing a study concerning the existence of external bias
and its effects).
21
Hallevy: The Defense Attorney as Mediator in Plea Bargains
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2009
C. Informed Consent in Plea Bargains
The characteristic of informed consent as an aspect of the mediation
process requires that the mediator provide the parties with free access to
relevant information, relating to all matters with which the mediator is
personally connected as a mediator and to the mediation process itself and to
personally transfer it to the parties.78 In so far as plea bargains are
concerned, it may be presumed that the prosecutor knows and is familiar
with the rules, procedure and relevant laws involved, and, therefore, there is
no need for a formal transfer of information between the prosecutor and the
defense attorney. The need arises most acutely within the framework of the
dialogue between the defense attorney and client. The defense attorney who
acts as a mediator in plea bargain negotiations must explain to the defendant
the relevant information relating to the roles of the parties in formulating the
bargain: the part the defendant is to play, the defense attorney's lack of
authority to impose a settlement on the parties, the requirement that the
defendant must give his personal consent in order for a deal to be worked
out, the legal status of the bargain and its enforcement, the possibility of
returning to court at any time if the plea bargain negotiations appear to be
failing, and even matters which relate to the defense attorney's fees. In fact,
every mediator is under an obligation to reveal details that are relevant to
both parties in cases where private litigation has been referred to
mediation,79 and, therefore, a plea bargain is no different in this respect.
Some commentators take the view that when one of the parties to mediation
is not represented by an advocate the mediator's obligations towards that
party are enhanced. 0 In the same way, the transfer of this information is far
more relevant within the framework of the dialogue between the defense
attorney and the defendant than it is in the dialogue between the defense
attorney and the prosecutor.
Regarding the transfer of material information in any criminal case
within the framework of negotiations leading to a plea bargain, a distinction
must be made between the different levels of awareness in relation to the
different amounts and quality of knowledge the parties have in their
possession. As a rule, situations in which one or both parties have all the
information necessary to make a decision are rare; therefore, the search for
78. Nolan-Haley, supra note 36, at 784-87.
79. See id, at 810-11 (discussing that mediators are generally under a duty of disclosure).
80. Id. at 833.
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information is relentless. 8' The result is that, in all probability, virtually all
decisions are taken on the basis of incomplete information.
82
Accordingly, in so far as informed consent is concerned, the mediation
process in general, and not only in the specific context of plea bargains,
requires a minimal level of awareness, which expresses itself in the
representation of the parties by advocates and the receipt of legal advice
from them during the course of the mediation.83 Similarly, in a plea bargain
in which the defense attorney serves as mediator, there exists a basis of
informed consent. The State is represented by attorneys as is the defendant.
The defense attorney, as mediator, has possession of the relevant
information relating to the defendant, who, as a rule, does not have
professional legal training, and has information held by the prosecution from
the attorneys representing the State. Where transfer of information is
prohibited by specific legal provisions relating to privilege, as we shall
discuss below, it may be supposed that these do not concern the prejudicial
effect on the rights of a party who lacks a defense because the existence of
the attorney-client privilege is between the defense attorney and the
defendant, not between the prosecution and its attorneys.
Moreover, the existence of attorney-client privilege between the defense
attorney and the defendant in the context of a plea bargain is likely to be a
temporary mechanism needed to maintain the defense attorney's objectivity
and to keep the defense attorney's status on par with that of the mediator. 84
Where the mediator arranges to meet with the parties separately, each of
them must reveal to the mediator information intended for the mediator's
eyes only and not to be passed on to the opposing side. This is for all intents
and purposes a form of privilege, the obligatory element of which falls on
the mediator. The attorney-client privilege operates in the same way, the
obligation being owed by the attorney to the client. The defense attorney
who meets with the defendant with the aim of formulating a plea bargain has
the same status as the mediator who holds a separate meeting with one of the
parties. The defense attorney and the mediator are both prohibited from
transferring information to the opposing side.
81. Stulberg, supra note 46, at 942.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 942-43.
84. See generally Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal
System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 239, 271 (2002) (discussing the need for confidentiality and
objectivity in the role of a mediator).
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In some respects, the mediator's disclosure obligations and the
requirement of informed consent constitute two sides of the same coin
because without disclosure of information there can be no informed
consent.8 5 Similar is the defense counsel's role as mediator in the plea
bargain. The minimal disclosure obligations required in mediation
proceedings in practice exist in the context of the plea bargain. The flow of
information relates to two types of dialogue-that which is carried on
between the defense attorney and the defendant and that which exists
between the defense attorney and the prosecutor. The result of plea bargain
negotiations depends upon the existence of informed consent, just as the
parties' informed consent is required in mediation proceedings. The defense
attorney, who has put together the details of the bargain with the
prosecution, still needs the informed consent of the client in order for the
deal to be approved. To reach this point, the defense attorney must transfer
to the client such relevant information as is necessary, including any details
of which the client demands to know, because, as part and parcel of this
transaction, the defense attorney may be incriminated with all the
implications that would entail.
D. Fairness and the Half-A-Loaf Theory in Plea Bargains
The characteristic of fairness in the context of mediation proceedings
obligates the mediator to enable the parties and, as previously stated, certain
third parties to realize their freedom of choice within the framework of their
autonomy and right to self-determination. 6 In order for the mediator to act
fairly towards the parties to the dispute, the mediator must fulfill four
conditions: protect the right of the parties to dignity and respect, achieve a
balance between the respective strengths of the parties, ensure the absence of
bias, and allow decisions to be made based on knowledge.87 The degree of
dignity and respect achieved can be measured primarily by examining the
extent to which the parties are treated as equals throughout the process.88
Defense counsel in a plea bargain conducts negotiations with the prosecutor
and the defense counsel's client, while emphasizing the terms and
prerogative each party has to decide to end the negotiations in the same way
85. Nolan-Haley, supra note 36, at 778.
86. See COLE, ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 46, at 2-3; Stulberg, supra note 46, at 910-914,
944-45.
87. BOULLE & NESIC, supra note 29, at 454.
88. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-74 (1977); See Michelle R.
Evans, Women and Mediation: Toward a Formulation of an Interdisciplinary Empirical Model to
Determine Equity in Dispute Resolution, 17 OHiO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 145, 170 (2001).
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they would be demanded from a mediator. 89 The defense attorney in a plea
bargain balances in a meaningful way the relative strengths of the
prosecution and the defendant. The defense attorney makes up for the
defendant's lack of legal knowledge when confronting the prosecuting
authorities; however, because the defense attorney has no power to
determine the matter, the defense attorney cannot impose his or her will but
can only air in a fair manner the stance adopted by the defendant. Expressed
through the defense attorney, the strength of the defendant's position is
balanced by the prosecution, thus creating a fair process.90
Ensuring the absence of bias is also a feature of the plea bargain, despite
the fact that, in the proceedings in question, the defense attorney represents
the defendant in confrontation with the prosecuting authorities-an issue
that will be addressed hereinafter when discussing the neutrality of the
defense attorney as a mediator. As a rule, if the defense attorney were to
function in a passive way, then strong preference would be given in the plea
bargain to the stronger party (i.e., the prosecuting authorities). 91 Providing
for the possibility of informed decision-making as a way to fairly balance
the power of the parties has been discussed above in relation to the attribute
of informed consent, which characterizes the defense attorney's role when
acting as mediator. The fairness of the result of the mediation process is part
and parcel of the fairness of the mediation proceedings themselves. In a plea
bargain, in which no gaps in information exist between the two sides and in
which the strengths of the parties are evenly balanced, the presumption is
that the result of the negotiations is a situation that reflects the best deal that
each of the parties could have obtained for themselves. 92 In fairness of this
sort, which looks to the outcome, defense counsel plays a supporting role by
providing information and balancing the forces, thereby contributing in the
capacity of mediator within the framework of the plea bargain to the fairness
of the entire agreement reached.
89. MODEL STANDARDS, MEDIATORS, supra note 37, at § 6.
90. See generally Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath:
Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1 (2000) (exploring the
concept of power disparities in negotiation).
91. See Madeleine B. Simborg & Joan B. Kelly, Beware of Stereotypes in Mediation, 17 FAM.
ADvOC. 69, 70 (1994).
92. See MILLER, McDONALD & CRAMER, supra note 55.
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E. Neutrality in Plea Bargains
As already mentioned, the commentators make a distinction between
neutrality and impartiality and, within this framework, suggest that
impartiality should be regarded as an essential and indispensable feature of
mediation proceedings, whereas neutrality may be regarded as a less than
absolute concept and may be realized or diminished without detrimentally
affecting the essential character of the proceedings. 93 Impartiality in this
context implies that equality, objectivity, and fairness must characterize the
manner in which the parties to mediation proceedings are treated, which
includes the amount of time they are given and the absence of any
appearance of favoritism. It would seem at face value that, because the
defendant is paying the defense attorney's fees in order that the attorney
should obtain the best possible legal result, defense counsel's ability to act
impartially is seriously flawed within the framework of a plea bargain or
otherwise. In spite of this assumption, however, legal research in the field
paints a very different picture and has clearly shown that the plea bargain
system, by its very nature, contradicts the normal attorney-client
relationship. 94 Some commentators have even gone as far as to argue that
plea bargains constitute a strong incentive for defense counsel to abandon
the fiduciary duty to his client when fulfilling this role. 95  It seems,
therefore, that the system of relations within the framework of the plea
bargain is more complicated than it appears to be at first glance. Prosecutors
and defense attorneys often have good relations with one another, personally
and professionally. If defense counsel shows "flexibility" in one set of
negotiations, the defense counsel may merit preferential treatment in other
cases. The defense counsel's contacts with the client are usually only short-
term in contrast to the relationship with counterparts at the prosecution
service, which are long-term and which will continue even after a specific
defendant's matter has been dealt with. In those states having a public
defender service, the relationship between the defense attorney and the
defendant will be substantially weaker. 96  In such states, the majority of
93. BOULLE & NESIC, supra note 29, at 18-19.
94. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1121, 1176 (1998) (focusing on the ethical role of prosecutors who find, in particular cases, that plea
bargaining is not operating in its expected fashion).
95. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1180 (1975).
96. See generally Debra S. Emmelman, Gauging the Strength of Evidence Prior to Plea
Bargaining: The Interpretive Procedures of Court-Appointed Defense Attorneys, 22 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 927, 930 (1997) (finding that defense attorneys gauge the strength of evidence through a
tacit, taken-for-granted process that emerges in three stages).
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defendants who are represented are represented by public defenders, and it is
only the minority who are represented by private attorneys. Where close ties
exist between the defense attorney and the specific prosecutor assigned to
the case, a tendency exists to bypass the prosecutor's authority and turn to a
higher authority within the framework of the plea bargain. 97 It should be
pointed out that even though similar sets of relations also exist between
judges, prosecuting attorneys, and defense attorneys, judges are still
perceived as being a neutral factor in criminal proceedings.
The initial proximity of the mediator to a specific party does not
necessarily cancel neutrality. In his article, Dean Pruitt recalls the success of
Henry Kissinger in mediation between Israel and Egypt before a peace
agreement was concluded between them.98 According to Pruitt, the initial
proximity of Kissinger to Israel at the start of the proceedings, the
sympathetic stance adopted by the United States towards Israel, and the
desire of the United States to end the conflict and have access to Arab oil
actually brought about larger concessions on Israel's part because the United
States was a friend from its point-of-view and was conveniently situated to
extract concessions. This scenario has repeated itself many times in
international mediation. 99 If the role of defense counsel is to assist the client
to arrive at a decision with regard to the plea bargain in question while
taking into account the prosecutor's concerns and, in so far as possible, the
broad picture of relevant data, then the defense counsel's function is no
different from that of any other mediator operating in the field of private
litigation. l00 If defense counsel assists the prosecutor during negotiations to
make a decision for a specific plea bargain, while enabling the prosecutor to
take into account the opposing side's concerns, then here too the defense
counsel's function is no different from that of any other mediator in private
litigation. There are some who argue that the mediator ought to interfere if it
appears that the stronger side is exploiting the weaker one, if there is a lack
97. See ELIAHU HARNON & KENNETH MANN, PLEA BARGAINING IN ISRAEL (1981).
98. See Dean G. Pruitt, Kissinger as a Traditional Mediator with Power, in DYNAMICS OF
THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION: KISSINGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 136, 141, 144 (Jeffrey Z. Rubin ed.,
1981).
99. See generally Saadia Touval & Ira W. Zartman, Introduction: Mediation in Theory, in
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7, 7-17 (Saadia Touval & Ira W. Zartman
eds., 1985).
100. See Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor
Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85, 96, 116 (1981); MOORE, supra note 59, at 52, 197; Peter Robinson,
Contending with Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: A Cautiously Cooperative Approach to Meditation
Advocacy, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 963, 963 (1998); Uphoff, supra note 68, at 87.
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of information, or if a third party may be adversely affected and that the
nature and extent of this interference should reflect the mediator's personal
values.' l l According to this approach, even when the defense attorney
exercises powers of persuasion on the prosecutor in the interests of the
client, who may be exploited because of a lack of information in the client's
possession or may have family, economic, or social interests at risk, the
defense attorney does not derogate from neutrality as a mediator in the plea
bargain negotiations.
There are those who argue that mediators involved in the resolution of
private legal quarrels are not neutral with regard to the practical outcome of
the proceedings before them and that their neutrality is more formal than
real; others go further still, suggesting that such mediators are also not
neutral with regard to the formal proceedings.'0 2 Mediators are generally
incapable of maintaining emotional detachment from the litigants10 3 and
may on occasion be either consciously or unconsciously influenced by their
personal leanings and preconceptions. 10 4  Nevertheless, the mediator in
private disputes is still regarded as a neutral figure because the mediator is
only human. It seems that the role of the defense counsel in plea bargain
negotiations is also no different from that of a mediator in mediation
proceedings when it comes to the issue of neutrality. This is also true in
relation to the duties of good faith and trust owed by the mediator to the
parties, which is comparable with those duties that an attorney owes to a
client. An advocate is also obliged to behave as an "officer of the court" at
the same time as representing a client. Thus, counsel for the defendant when
appearing in court or engaging in plea bargaining also owes duties to the
proceedings in general and to the opposing side. Similarly, the mediator
simultaneously owes a duty of trust to both parties, while addressing what is
101. JOHN M. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION 62-63, 129-31 (1981).
102. Compare David Greatbatch and Robert Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some
Preliminary Observations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 L. & Soc'Y REV. 613, 639
(1989) ("Mediator only becomes a problem when formal and substantive neutrality are confused so
that the pressure becomes invisible or when the choice of goals remains a purely personal matter
rather than one for which the practitioner may be socially accountable."), with Robert Dingwall,
Empowerment or Enforcement? Some Questions about Power and Control in Divorce Mediation, in
DIVORCE MEDIATION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 166 (Robert Dingwall & John Eekelaar eds., 1988)
(describing how a mediator's gender and what type of formalities, particularly what type of party
behavior, will be acceptable during the mediation).
103. See Cohen, Dattner & Luxenburg, supra note 58, at 342.
104. Paul V. Olczak, Resistance to Mediation: A Social-Clinical Analysis, in COMMUNITY
MEDIATION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS AND RESEARCHERS 153, 158 (Karen Grover Duffy
et al. eds., 1991).
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required to run the mediation proceedings, including the need to balance the
parties' relative strengths.105
V. CONCLUSIONS
A modem examination of plea bargains in accordance with the
characteristics of mediation proceedings reveals that a substantial similarity
exists between plea bargain procedures and those proceedings to the extent
that it is not difficult to see that plea bargains involve a specific type of
mediation. The legal dispute in the case of the plea bargain according to the
adversarial model, which is based on a legal tug of war (lis) between two
sides, is the dispute between the prosecutor and the defendant with the
defense counsel serving as mediator. 10 6 An examination of the role of the
defense counsel in the formulation of a plea bargain based on the
characteristics of the mediation process also shows that substantial similarity
exists between the function of the defense attorney in plea bargain
negotiations and that of the mediator. This similarity does not exist by
chance. Both the plea bargain and mediation are forms of ADR, and both
give the parties the certainty and the ability to control the proceedings.
However, while in a civil case the mediator fulfills a formal position
disconnected from the parties, in plea bargain negotiations there is no such
detachment-the role of mediator is fulfilled by the defense counsel despite
ostensible identification with one of the parties.
In view of the substantial similarities between plea bargains and
mediation proceedings and the possibility of treating the plea bargain as a
form of ADR in criminal cases, it has been suggested that reference be made
to the wealth of experience that has accumulated as a result of using
mediation as an alternative to private litigation, to learn from it, and to seek
ways to implement it within the framework of the plea bargain. 10 This
implementation is likely to relate to both the plea bargain itself, as a
proceeding, and the special function of the defense attorney within the
105. See John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?,
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 857-66, 881-86 (1997).
106. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931, 933 (1983) (discussing how
plea bargaining turns lawyers into judges and judges into figureheads).
107. See Sherry R. Wetsch, Alternative Dispute Resolution-An Introduction for Legal
Assistance Attorneys, 2000 ARMY LAW 8, 8 (2000); Richard M. Calkins, Mediation: The Gentler
Way, 41 S.D. L. REV. 277, 277-313 (1996).
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framework of the plea bargain.108  Putting the accumulated experience
acquired during private mediation proceedings into practice in the context of
plea bargaining is likely to express itself in values elicited from the rules of
professional ethics, the conduct of negotiations, the use of pressure tactics,
the creation of multi-party duties of good faith, the opportunity for the
defendant to understand the damage that the defendant caused to the
community, and the defendant's integration into the decision-making
process.' 09 Within this framework, it will also be possible for discussions to
take place between the defendant and the victim of the crime, something that
is essentially lacking in current plea bargain procedure. °"0 To ignore the
108. See generally Samuel J. Imperati, Mediator Practice Models: The Intersection of Ethics
and Stylistic Practices in Mediation, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 703, 741 (1997) (stating that parties to
a mediation are more likely to be satisfied when they know what to expect, which is more likely to
occur if the mediator understands different styles of mediation and the relationship of model practice
standards and those styles); ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 81-95 (1994)
(describing the transformative view of mediation and how implementation of that model assists
parties in taking responsibility for their actions); John Lande, Toward More Sophisticated Mediation
Theory, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 321, 322 (discussing how the practice of mediators has benefited by
coming to a greater understanding of the difference between evaluative and facilitative mediations
and when each model should be used); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers, and
Mediation: Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 235, 238-39 (2002) (describing the benefit of attorneys using the tools of mediation
in adversarial settings); Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediator For? ": Mediation 's
"Value-Added"for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 9-12 (1996) (outlining how
strategic and cognitive biases distort views and make it difficult to reach optimal negotiation
agreements); Michael Pryles, Assessing Dispute Resolution Procedures, 7 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 267,
277-78 (1996) (discussing the advantage of learning and using the various flexible methods of
mediation in litigation).
109. See generally Adam Lamparello, Note, Reaching Across Legal Boundaries: How
Mediation Can Help the Criminal Law in Adjudicating "Crimes of Addiction, " 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 335, 336 (2001) ("Mediation can serve as an effective means of resurrecting
rehabilitative ends that address an individual's addiction, thereby leading offenders on the path to
recovery."); Gary D. Williams, Note: Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Mediating Estate Planning
Issues Before Disputes Between Family Members Arise: The Scale Tips in Favor of Mediation, 16
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 819, 829-34 (2001) (listing a number of benefits of using mediation
instead of traditional litigation including educating clients about how their actions brought about the
legal conflict); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality, Fairness, and Freedom
in Dispute Resolution: Serving Dispute Resolution Through Adjudication, 3 NEv. L.J. 305, 353
(2003) (noting that a healthy court system ensures that mediation can realize its goals without
devolving into something dysfunctional).
110. See Alana Dunnigan, Comment, Restoring Power to the Powerless: The Need to Reform
California's Mandatory Mediation for Victims of Domestic Violence, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 1031, 1032-
33 (2003) (noting that California has imposed mandatory mediation in domestic abuse crimes
requiring the victim to mediate with the abuser); Adina Levine, A Dark State of Criminal Affairs:
ADR Can Restore Justice to the Criminal "Justice" System, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 369,
375 n.29 (2003) ("The most significant impact ADR has had on the criminal process is victim-
offender mediation, part of restorative justice.").
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vast experience accumulated in this field of dispute resolution and the
manner in which it can be applied to a substantially similar proceeding-
albeit one that has its own special characteristics-would create an
enormous rift between ADR methods in civil and criminal cases. It is
difficult to see how such a rift could be justified in any modem legal system.
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